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Time Sharing: The North Carolina General Assembly's Response to
Ownership of Time Share Contracts
I. INTRODUCTION
You just purchased a dream vacation home at Atlantic Beach, North
Carolina. It is not really a house, but two glorious weeks a year at the
Whaler Inn, a time share resort complex at one of North Carolina's finest
vacation beaches. The decision to buy a time share unit was easy: two
great weeks a year in a multi-million dollar resort; a professionally deco-
rated unit of your choice; amenities you could never afford in a single
family home; full room service, and access to a pool; no maintenance
work because maintenance is included in a nominal monthly service fee;
new people to meet in the forty-six other time share units; and, best of
all, your time share cost tens of thousands of dollars less than a single
family vacation home. Now you can work hard all year, waiting for
those two joyous weeks at Atlantic Beach.
But wait! You receive a letter from a court-appointed receiver inform-
ing you that the Whaler Inn is insolvent. A bank you never heard of is
proceeding to foreclose on your time share unit. When you purchased
your time share the salesman assured you that the deed you would re-
ceive from the owner protected your investment. You write the North
Carolina Attorney General seeking help. The Attorney General informs
you that the time share developer borrowed nearly two million dollars to
finance conversion of the Whaler Inn from a resort hotel to a time share
project. The developer secured the loan with a first mortgage on all
Whaler units. For unknown reasons, the time share developer defaulted
on mortgage payments. The Attorney General offers some hope that
your time share interest is protected from the lender's lien. If you re-
ceived a release from the developer's mortgage-lender and a deed from
the time share developer, then your time share is protected. You vaguely
remember something about a release and deed, however, you did not re-
ceive either one.
Months pass and you receive more letters. The mortgage-lender, who
has a lien on all the time share units, offers an "accommodation," prom-
ising to release the lien on your time share interest in the Whaler Inn for
a payment equal to thirty-two and one-half percent of the original sales
price. The "accommodation" is in addition to monies you have already
paid or may have to pay in the future to the time share developer. The
court-appointed receiver sends you a letter stating that, although you can
accept the mortgage-lender's "accommodation," the receiver cannot is-
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sue a deed to your unit because materialmen have filed liens against all
the time share units. The receiver proposes another plan to save your
investment. The existing time share interest owners must commit to
raise sufficient funds among themselves to satisfy existing materialman
liens. Your share would be approximately two thousand dollars. You
agree to pay your share. After several weeks have passed, the court-
appointed receiver advises you that an insufficient number of time share
owners have responded to his plan. A North Carolina superior court
approves the mortgage-lender's petition for foreclosure. The Whaler Inn
is to be sold in less than three weeks. You receive a letter from the Attor-
ney General's office stating that, in order to forestall foreclosure, the time
share developer has filed for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy; a rehabilitation
plan to save the Whaler Inn will be presented to the bankruptcy court.
The mortgage-lender petitions the bankruptcy court to lift the stay on
foreclosure; however, the motion is denied and the bankruptcy trustee is
given time to devise a plan to rehabilitate the Whaler Inn.
Welcome to the world of time sharing.
Since the early 1970's in the United States,1 time sharing has become a
significant and growing method of owning an interest in, or occupying,
vacation residential property2 for extended periods. As demonstrated by
the Whaler Inn experience,3 time sharing can be an attractive investment
for both the time share developer and purchaser, or a pitfall for the un-
wary investor. Time sharing offers individuals without the desire to
purchase a single family vacation home or without sufficient financial
resources the opportunity of owning their own vacation home. Individu-
als can purchase a fractional property interest in the time share or the
right to occupy a vacation home, normally in a development complex,
for a predetermined number of days each year. Compared to the cost of
full home ownership, time sharing is a viable financial alternative.' Time
sharing substantially expands marketing potential for real estate develop-
1. For a brief but informative history of the time sharing concept as developed in Europe and
adapted in the United States, see generally Comment, Time-Share Condominiums: Property's Fourth
Dimension, 32 ME. L. Rv. 181, 181-82 (1980); Gunnar, Regulation of Resort Time-Sharing, 57 OR.
L. REv. 31, 31-32 (1977); Pollack, Time Sharing or Time Is Money But Will It Sell?, 10 REAL EsT.
L.J. 281, 283 (1982).
2. Time sharing is not limited in concept to vacation homes or real property. Pollack de-
scribes "more exotic types of housing, including houseboats." Pollack, supra note 1, at 283. Even
more exotic applications have been identified. Some of these time share projects are recreational
vehicle lots, yachts, and ocean cruisers. Comment, Timesharing: A Unique Property Concept Creates
The Need For Comprehensive Legislation, 25 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 629, 630 n.8 (1981).
3. In re Time Sharing, Inc., No. M-84-01551-4 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. December 27, 1984).
4. Gunnar, supra note 1, at 32. While purchasing a fractional time share interest is less costly
for the individual when compared to the cost of full home ownership, the total cost of purchasing all
of the fractional time share interests is greater than if one individual purchased a comparable vaca-
tion home. Roodhouse, Fractional Time Period Ownership of Recreational Condominiums, 4 REAL
EsT. L.J. 35, 38 (1975). See generally M. HENZE, THE LAw AND BusINEss oF TImE-SHARE RE-
somrs § 1.04 (1984) (comprehensive discussion of advantages and disadvantages of time sharing).
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ers by reducing the cost of a vacation resort to a level which is affordable
by most middle class families. Enhanced market potential is especially
important in an industry recently plagued by historically high interest
rates and conversely slumping market demand.'
The potential pitfalls in purchasing a time share are numerous. The
term "time sharing"6 describes numerous contractual arrangements
which are not readily defined by the common law classifications of real
property estates.' Pursuant to case law decisions and statutory law, the
classification of property interests dictates numerous rights and obliga-
tions. Therefore, the sale of time shares raises serious questions for the
time share purchaser and developer as to what, if any, legal interest is
being conveyed. High pressure sales tactics associated with time sharing
also present practical problems as well as legal considerations.
The North Carolina General Assembly enacted the North Carolina
Time Share Act (NCTSA or Act) to protect the time share purchaser
from the inherent problems in time sharing.' The NCTSA prohibits the
sale of time shares after July 1, 1984 unless the time share project is
registered with, and salesmen are licensed by, the North Carolina Real
Estate Commission.9 The Act requires detailed disclosures to potential
purchasers prior to sale,'I a "cooling-off" period following the sale,1" rec-
ordation of the instrument conveying the time share interest12 and lim-
ited protection of time share owners in the management and operation of
the time share development. 3 The North Carolina General Assembly
authorized the North Carolina Real Estate Commission to regulate time
5. Comment, supra note 1, at 181-82.
6. "Time sharing" is a term originating in the computer industry denoting a central data bank
accessed by separate users on an established time agreement. D. PARKER, CRIME BY COMPUTER
107-11 (1976).
7. One author correctly concludes that "[t]here are almost as many methods of conveying
time-shared titles as there are developers in the field. Many of them are unsound, amateurish at-
tempts at accomplishing a complex legal result." Davis, Time-Sharing Ownership - Legal and Practi-
cal Problems, 48 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1183, 1183 (1974).
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93A-39 to -57 (Cum. Supp. 1983) (effective July 1, 1984). Vacation
exchange programs can be offered in conjunction with time share developments. Exchange pro-
grams permit time share owners to "trade [their] allocated time period for a similar period in any
one of many similar projects in other resort areas around the world." Eastman, Time Share Owner-
ship: A Primer, 57 N.D.L. REv. 151, 153 (1981). Vacation exchange programs are not within the
scope of this comment.
Vacation exchange programs present a unique set of practical and legal problems. The NCTSA
regulates exchange programs. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93A-48 to -49 (Cum. Supp. 1983). One North
Carolina attorney, reviewing a draft of the proposed time share legislation, observed that she could
not "understand the preoccupation of the bill with the exchange programs." Letter from Sue V.
McCown to Representative Charles D. Evans (June 10, 1983) (available from the North Carolina
General Statutes Commission).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-40 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
10. Id. § 93A-44.
11. Id. § 93A-45.
12. Id. § 93A-42(b).
13. Id. § 93A-47.
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share developers and salesmen. The Real Estate Commission was
granted the power to enforce the Act.14 Most importantly, the NCTSA
declares that "[a] time share is deemed to be an interest in real estate, and
shall be governed by the law of this State relating to real estate." 15
Part II of this comment analyzes the potential effect of the NCTSA's
expansive definition of time shares as an interest in real property in rela-
tion to the prevalent forms of time share agreements. While the Act
makes time share an "interest" in real property, the state's courts will
likely face obstacles in defining the exact nature of that "interest." Part
III explores the statutory provisions designed for consumer protection in
the sale of time shares. Part IV reviews the NCTSA's provisions for
management of time share projects. This comment suggests additional
protections which would afford more protection to the substantial invest-
ment of time share purchasers.
II. TIME SHARES AS A REAL PROPERTY INTEREST
Time sharing is deceptively simple in concept. The time share pur-
chaser obtains a property interest in or a right to use a residential unit
exclusively for a predetermined period each year for a recurring number
of years.1 6 Because time sharing reduces "property ownership and occu-
pancy to a temporal element... ,"I it radically departs from tradi-
tional property concepts, which measure ownership by the metes and
bounds of the estate. The two basic forms of time sharing are those pur-
porting to convey a property interest in real estate and those that merely
sell a right to use a unit. Within the two basic forms, many hybrid prop-
erty interests are being marketed. Classifying the numerous time sharing
property interests within the traditional law of property is extremely dif-
ficult,1 8 yet, significant legal rights and duties flow from the classification
14. Id. § 93A-54.
15. Id. § 93A-42(a) (emphasis added).
16. Comment, supra note 2, at 629. A perplexing problem in any analysis of time sharing is the
numerous terms that are applied to describe the same concept. One author notes that "[t]he variety
of terminology used by the [time share] industry coupled with the novelty of the concept can leave
the time share purchaser with an erroneous understanding of the interest he has purchased." Id. at
631. This problem is recognized by most authors who have written on the subject. See generally
Comment, supra note 1, at 184; Johnakin, Legislation For Time Share Ownership Projects, 10 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 606, 606 n.3 (1975). One author mused that "[a] particularly pressing need
. . . is to establish uniform terminology. Already there is considerable... confusion, which unnec-
essarily amplifies the possibility of litigation." Comment, Legal Challenges To Time Sharing Owner-
ship, 45 Mo. L. REv. 423, 441 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Legal Challenges]. This comment uses the
definitions provided in the NCTSA whenever possible.
17. Comment, supra note 2, at 630-31. See generally Comment, supra note 1, at 181 (a compre-
hensive and thoughtful analysis of time sharing within the traditional property law); Pollack, supra
note 1, at 282 (brief but incisive analysis of temporal ownership and possession).
18. As one authority cogently and descriptively notes:
The study of property law is somewhat like playing a pinball machine. The logic of the law
places all property into categories and ascribes peculiar legal attributes to the location of the
4
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of the property interest employed. 19
The NCTSA mandates that all forms of time shares are interests in
property and are subject to North Carolina real property law.2' The Act
expansively refers to freehold estates as time share estates, and to non-
freehold2' estates, licenses and bonds as time share licenses.22 The preva-
lent forms of time share estates are the time share tenancy-in-common,
interval ownership, and the estate for years. The most common form of
time share license in the vacation license.23
A. Time Share Tenancy-in-Common
The most frequently marketed form of time share estate is the tenancy-
in-common. Units in the time share complex are divided into one-week
item in each classification. The answer to a problem consists of dropping the property into the
proper slot.
1 G. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 6, at 33 (1980).
19. G. PINDAR, AMERICAN REAL ESTATE LAW § 1-1, at 2 (1976) ("Land ownership is often
described as a bundle of rights, powers, and privileges .... The bundles also include a number of
duties or liabilities .. ").
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-42 (Cum. Supp. 1983). This provision of the Act was in response
to two judicial decisions. In State v. Carriage House Assocs., 94 Nev. 709, 709, 585 P.2d 1337, 1339
(1978), the Nevada Supreme Court held that time shares which were sold as "vacation licenses"
were neither licenses nor leases, because they were irrevocable and transferrable and because the
description of the property and the duration of the contract were indefinite. The court found that
the "vacation license" was only a contractual right and represented no interest in property. Id. A
federal bankruptcy court held that "club memberships" were not a lease but "more akin to an option
.... " In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc., 18 Bankr. 612, 619 (S.D. Fla. 1982). See infra notes 57-76
and accompanying text.
21. The distinction between freehold and non-freehold estates is that the freehold interest is one
greater than a leasehold. 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 18, § 1850, at 374.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-41(9) (Cum. Supp. 1983). The Act specifically limits a time share
to contracts that provide for occupancy for five or more separated time periods lasting at least five
years. Id.
The terms "time share estate" and "time share license" are definitions adopted by the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in its UNIFORM REAL ESTATE TIME SHARE
AcT (URETSA). URETSA § 1-102(13), 7A U.L.A. 310 (Supp. 1985). The NCTSA adopted
URETSA's definition of time share. No assumption should be made, however, that definitions in the
industry or among the states are uniform. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See generally
Burek, Uniform Real Estate Time-Share Act, 14 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 683 (1979) (simple
overview of URETSA excluding minor amendments subsequent to publication).
The National Time Sharing Council of the American Land Development Association and the
National Association of Real Estate License Law Officials jointly promulgated a MODEL TIME
SHARE Acr (NARELLO). The Model Act does not distinguish between time share estates and time
share licenses as such. MODEL TIME SHARE AcT § 102(33) (1983). This makes NARELLO more
flexible than URETSA, even though it does not adequately resolve the property interest problem.
See generally Catalina, Real Estate Time Sharing: Protecting the Buyer, 9 REAL EST. L.J. 144, 146-
49 (1980); Podgers, Two Groups Propose Time-Share Legislation, 66 A.B.A.J. 543 (1980) (detailed
comparison of URETSA and NARELLO); Pollack, supra note 1, at 296-300.
23. M. HENzE, supra note 4, §§ 3.01-.04. Other forms of time share licenses, stock coopera-
tives, resort or vacation clubs, and limited partnerships are not covered in this comment. For a
description of these forms of time sharing licenses see id. §§ 3.02[5]-.02[7]. See generally Ellsworth,
Owning A Resort - The Timesharing Plan, NAT'L L.J., April 20, 1981, at 17, col. 6 (overview of
vacation clubs); Pollack, supra note 1, at 285-86 (excellent discussion of vacation clubs).
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occupancy segments. The purchaser receives an undivided estate in the
entire resort property proportionate to the length of occupancy. Cove-
nants are executed among all purchasers, either in the contract of sale or
deed, establishing uniform conditions of occupancy, management, and
control of the development.24
Although the tenancy-in-common time share estate closely conforms
to common law property principles,25 in North Carolina it requires mod-
ification of both the common law right of equal possession of the prem-
ises by all co-tenants and the statutory right of partition. The ability to
legally covenant for fixed periods of exclusive possession is essential to
the time share purchaser.26 The right of tenants-in-common to contract
inter se for periods of exclusive possession was specifically permitted in
North Carolina27 prior to the passage of the NCTSA. Furthermore, each
co-tenant of property owned as tenants-in-common personally holds the
statutory right of partition.2"
There are two types of statutory partition in North Carolina. "In
kind" partition may result in a physical division of the real property by
equitably subdividing the single tract into separate plots equal to the
number of tenants-in-common requesting partition, with each owning a
subdivided plot in fee simple. If "in kind" partition is not possible, parti-
tion "by sale" is authorized, whereby sale proceeds are divided equally
among the co-tenants.29
Obviously, an unfettered right of partition would utterly destroy the
time share concept of exclusive possession in multi-party ownership be-
cause one disgruntled owner could force partition. Since by its very na-
ture a time share unit could not be physically partitioned, partition
necessarily would be "by sale." The NCTSA recognizes the threat of
partition to time sharing and exempts time shares from the statutory
24. M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 3.03[2][a]. The tenancy-in-common approach is treated in every
major work on the subject of time sharing. For the best treatments, see generally, Davis, supra note
7, at 1185-87; Eastman, supra note 8, at 153; Gray, Pioneering The Concept of Time-Sharing Owner-
ship, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1196 (1974); Pollack, supra note 1, at 284.
25. P. HETRICK, WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 110 (rev. ed. 1981).
26. In the tenancy-in-common time share estate, each purchaser owns an undivided, but not
necessarily equal, interest in the property but has an equal right of possession. Of the four common
law unities necessary to create the estate, only unity of possession is required. Id See generally 4 G.
THOMPSON, supra note 18, § 1795, at 145. Most time share projects either sell possession for a
specific week recurring each year, or contract to provide a week during the year based on owner
preference and availability of units. Eastman, supra note 8, at 153-56.
27. Eg., Parslow v. Parslow, 47 N.C. App. 84, 266 S.E.2d 746 (1980); P. HE cK, supra note
25, § 115; 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 18, § 1795.
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-1 (1984); see, eg., Stanley v. Cox, 253 N.C. 620, 117 S.E.2d 826
(1961) (the covenant is binding on heirs, personal representatives, and assigns who take with notice).
If the time share instrument is recorded as permitted by the NCTSA, recordation would provide the
required notice. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-42 (Cum. Supp. 1983). See generally Comment, supra note
1, at 185-87 (excellent discussion of the necessity of covenants in time share projects).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-22 (1984).
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right of partition "in kind" or "by sale."O3 The statute, however, autho-
rizes partition "by sale" of each individual's time share interest.31 In
effect, this permits two or more owners of a single time share, as tenants-
in-common, joint tenants, or tenants by the entirety, to partition their
own interests without jeopardizing the rights of co-tenants.
As an illustration, partition of a single time share interest may be re-
quired in divorce proceedings. A district court could award title of the
time share interest to one spouse, by deed, and thereby effectuate a sale of
the other spouse's interest in the time share.32 While no North Carolina
cases have been reported in which a divorce proceeding has involved dis-
position of a time share interest, recently reported cases in other jurisdic-
tions have dealt with time share interests.33
The NCTSA provides a solid legal basis on which a tenancy-in-com-
mon estate may be marketed because it expands common law concepts of
the tenancy-in-common estate and exempts time shares, except the single
time share interest, from the statutory right of partition. The Act should
facilitate consumer acceptance of this form of time sharing and lender
financing.34
B. Interval 35 Ownership Time Share Estates
The interval ownership time share estate is the most unusual property
concept being marketed by developers. Interval ownership can assume
three distinct legal forms. The essential concept underlying each form is
the creation of a separate fee estate in the time share unit for each pur-
chaser, recurring annually, for the duration of the estate. The objective
of interval ownership is to create an exclusive right to possession in each
time share owner without the necessity of covenants as contemplated by
the time share tenancy-in-common approach.36
30. Id. § 93A43 (Cum. Supp. 1983). The North Carolina General Statutes Commission gener-
ally adopted the URETSA approach to partition. Memorandum from Monica K. Kalo to the Gen-
eral Statutes Commission's Condominium Statutes Drafting Committee (undated) (available from
the North Carolina General Statutes Commission). Co-tenants have the right to contractually waive
partition for a "reasonable" period. P. HETRiCK, supra note 25, § 123. See generally Comment,
supra note 1, at 187-90; Legal Challenges. supra note 16, at 432-35.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-43 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
32. Id. § 50-20(c), (g) (1984).
33. Eg., Farkas v. Farkas, 452 So. 2d 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
34. The financing of time share developments is beyond the scope of this comment. For a
survey of the problems in this area, see generally, Davis, supra note 7, at 1187-90; Dunn, Lending to
the Resort Timesharing Industry, 63 J. CoM. BANK LENDING 24 (1981); Gray, supra note 24, at
1201-02; Johnson, Timeshare Financing: A Lending Opportunity, 42 MORTGAGE BANKING 6 (1982).
35. The term "interval" is not used to denote a property interest or any rights or duties arising
from any estate in land. It is merely used to denote a time sharing sales concept. The term was
coined by the developer initially using this form of time sharing. Note, New Ideas in the Vacation
Home Market, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1203, 1217 (1974).
36. Comment, supra note 1, at 202.
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1. Fee Simple Absolute Estate
The first form of interval ownership time sharing is simply a convey-
ance of a fee simple absolute estate, limited to fixed dates each year for
each time share purchaser. 37 While the fee simple absolute estate is rec-
ognized in every American jurisdiction, the limitation of this estate to a
specific period, recurring annually, is a unique feature of real property
law. The fee simple absolute is the greatest estate in land that may be
conveyed. It is conceptualized as ownership of "the entire property, with
unconditional power of disposition . ,,38 Interval ownership seeks to
engraft temporality, a new characteristic of the fee simple absolute, in a
single property.39
The crucial question raised by this form of interval ownership estate is
whether North Carolina courts will recognize multiple fee simple abso-
lute estates in the same real property absent statutory authorization.4°
The greater weight of authority in the United States refuses judicial sanc-
tion of multiple fee simple absolutes in the same property.41 Historically,
multiple fee simple absolutes in one property were simply not envi-
sioned,42 and "[s]ince [the Statute of Uses in 1540] no new types [of es-
tates] have been formed by the law, and it is recognized today that it is
beyond the grantor, settlor or testator to create a new type of estate."'43
This reasoning is best reflected in Moore v. McKinley,' in which the
Supreme Court of Iowa held that only one fee simple in a given tract of
37. M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 3.03[3]. The conveyance may be described as follows:
Unit 2A in building 3 of Block 2 of Filing 117 in the Winterland Subdivision, County of Sum-
mit, State of Colorado, for the period of the 7th week of each year, beginning on the 7th Satur-
day of each year at noon, and ending on the 8th Saturday of each year at noon.
Id.
38. G. PiNDAR, supra note 19, § 7-5, at 208 (emphasis added). See generally P. HET iCK,
supra note 25, at 35; 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 18, § 1856, at 412.
39. M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 3.03[3].
40. Many state statutes, including North Carolina's, define the term time share broadly enough
to encompass interval ownership even though it is not specifically authorized. The difficulty is in
classifying the term within the common law real property estates. Colorado, however, specifically
authorizes several forms of interval ownership as new estates in property. COLO. Rlv. STAT. § 38-
33-110(1) (1973). The Condominium Statutes Drafting Committee chose neither to permit nor to
deny use of interval estates despite the fact that interval ownership is not a recognized property
estate in North Carolina. Minutes of the Condominium Statutes Drafting Committee of the North
Carolina General Statutes Commission (February 14, 1980) (available from the North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes Commission).
41. G. PINDAR, supra note 19, § 7-5, at 208-09.
42. 1 G. THOMPSON, supra note 18, § 32, at 145-53.
43. 4 id. § 1848, at 366. URETSA would provide a contrary result. It provides that "notwith-
standing any contrary rule of common law, a grant of an estate in a unit conferring the right to
possession during a potentially infinite number of separated time periods creates an estate in fee
simple having the character and incidents of such an estate at common law .... " URETSA § 1-
103, 7A U.L.A. 313-14 (Supp. 1985).
44. 246 Iowa 734, 69 N.W.2d 73 (1955); see also In re McBride's Estate, 253 Mich. 305, 235
N.W. 166 (1931); Humphrey's Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 113 Tex. 247, 254 S.W. 296 (1923). But see
Ocean Shore R.R. v. Doelger, 127 Cal. App. 2d 392, 274 P.2d 23 (1954).
8
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land is possible. This issue was not addressed in the NCTSA, and inter-
val fee simple absolute estates have not been judicially recognized in
North Carolina. In the absence of specific statutory authorization, it is
unlikely that North Carolina courts will recognize this form of interval
ownership.
It has been suggested that the fee simple absolute interval estate can be
recognized theoretically within common law classifications of estates if
the multiple fee simple absolutes are connected by either shifting or
springing executory interests." In time sharing, the annual shifting exec-
utory interest would end the current owner's interval estate in favor of
the next time share owner. A springing executory interest would remain
in the time share developer-grantor until all time shares in a unit were
sold.' Both the springing and shifting executory interests are subject to
the Rule Against Perpetuities,47 and should afford enthusiasts of the
Rule hours of theoretical exercise in determining if the perpetually shift-
ing or springing estates vest or fail in accordance with the Rule.
2. Estate for Years
The second form of interval ownership time sharing employs a convey-
ance of an estate for years48 with a remainder in fee simple to all purchas-
ers as tenants-in-common.49 It is deceptively simple in design and may
be classified readily within established common law property estates.
Both the estate for years and the fee simple estate as tenants-in-common
are fundamental to the real property law of this state. The North Caro-
lina common law doctrine of merger, however, effectively prohibits the
sale of interval estates which are based on an estate for years with a fee
simple remainder to the tenants-in-common.
The doctrine of merger5° is fully defined in Trust Co. v. Watkins.51
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that "when a life tenant or
45. M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 3.03[3]. See generally L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW or
FUTURE INTERESTS § 12, at 25-28 (2d ed. 1966) (definitions of both executory interests).
46. M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 3.03[3].
47. The Rule is "[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one
years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." L. SiMEs, supra note 45, § 127, at 263.
The application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to interval time share estates is beyond the scope of
this comment. For a statement of the Rule and its judicial application, see Peele v. Wilson County
Bd. of Educ., 37 N.C. App. 168, 289 S.E.2d 890, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 386, 294 S.E.2d 210 (1982).
48. An estate for years is a lease granting exclusive possession for a definite period. 3 G.
THOMPSON, supra note 18, § 1017, at 14-15. In the context of time sharing, the usual term of the
leasehold is the anticipated life of the development. Johnakin, supra note 16, at 607.
49. Comment, supra note 1, at 201-02. Because each time share purchaser holds a leasehold
estate, covenants are necessary to determine inter se rights. The requirement of covenants is thought
to negate the benefits of this interval estate as compared with the time share estate based on a
tenancy-in-common. Id. at 201 n.24.
50. The majority view of merger in the United States is that it is not favored in law or equity.
Most courts will not apply the doctrine unless the parties intended to do so. 3A G. THOMPSON,
supra note 18, § 1204, at 18-22.
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lessee for years acquires the fee in remainder or reversion ... the estates
are merged." 2 Under the Watkins rationale, the lesser estate (the estate
for years) immediately merges into the greater estate (the fee simple as
tenants-in-common) by operation of law. 3  While the Watkins court
based its holding on facts in which a tenancy and remainder were held by
one individual in the same property, multiple tenancies and fee simple
remainders in the same share time unit logically lead to the same result.
The unit owners collectively hold the entire tenancy and remainder in the
same property. The probable result is that the estate for years with a
remainder in the fee interval ownership form of time sharing will not be
recognized in North Carolina without statutory modification of the doc-
trine of merger. 4
3. Variation of the Estate for Years
The third form of interval ownership time sharing employs a variation
of the estate for years with a remainder in fee simple. The estate for
years is replaced by a defeasible estate for years with a shifting executory
interest. A remainder in fee to all purchasers, as tenants-in-common,
follows the defeasible estate for years. The objective, similar to that of
the fee simple absolute interval estate, is to create an estate and a right of
exclusive possession in a purchaser only during the time periods
purchased, without the necessity of covenants. Each time share owner
would be defeased annually, at the conclusion of the period established
by the tenancy, but would come into the tenancy and exclusive occu-
pancy during the next year. Occupancy, therefore, arises from owner-
ship and not by covenant.5" At the end of the estate for years, usually
calculated by the useful life of the time share units, all owners take pos-
session as tenants-in-common. At this time, the owners may either sell
the property or reinstitute a time sharing plan.
Like the interval estate based on the estate for years with remainder in
fee simple, the defeasible estate for years probably will fail to gain judicial
acceptance in North Carolina because of the doctrine of merger. Under
the holding in Watkins, the defeasible estate for years (the lesser estate)
will merge by operation of law with the remainder in fee simple as ten-
ants-in-common (the greater estate). Further, the use of a shifting execu-
51. 215 N.C. 292, 1 S.E.2d 853 (1939). See generally P. HETRicK, supra note 25, § 85, at 91.
URETSA would except time shares from the doctrine of merger. See supra note 43.
52. Watkins, 215 N.C. at 297, 1 S.E.2d at 857.
53. Id.
54. See supra note 40.
55. Legal Challenges, supra note 16, at 427. See generally 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 18,
§ 1870, at 514-27. The term of years is defeasible in that the estate ends each year at the conclusion
of the agreed period and is subject to a shifting executory limitation resulting in the next owner
taking his estate from the defeased occupant. 4A id. at 535-42.
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tory interest to connect the multiple tenancies for years raises the
possibility that the Rule Against Perpetuities may apply. 6
The three forms of interval estates being marketed simply do not com-
port with common law principles of real property estate classification. If
the conveyance of interval estates is attempted in North Carolina, courts
should, because of the doctrine of merger, hold that the property interest
owned is a tenancy-in-common among the interval purchasers.
C. Time Share Leases and Licenses
At early common law, a leasehold was not an interest in real prop-
erty. 7 Modem common law uniformly provides that a lease is an inter-
est in real property 8 even though it is still treated as personal property
for some purposes.5 9 A lease is classified as an interest in real property
because the lessee has an exclusive right to possession of the demised
premises against all individuals, including the lessor. Therefore, the
NCTSA's mandate that all time share leases be deemed interests in prop-
erty does not alter existing North Carolina common law concepts.
The vacation lease is prevalent among the non-freehold time share es-
tates that are not coupled with a freehold remainder. The time share
developer simply grants an estate for years to the purchaser and retains
the right of reversion following the tenancy." The relationship created is
that of landlord and tenant.61
The time share license is similar to the vacation lease. Title to the
property remains with the time share developer while the time share pur-
chaser is granted the right to use a unit on contracted terms. The time
share license was developed primarily to circumvent state real estate de-
velopment and broker licensing laws62 in those jurisdictions that exempt
the sale of licenses. That objective will not succeed in North Carolina,
however, because the NCTSA requires the registration of time share de-
velopments and the licensing of brokers and salesmen by the Real Estate
Commission. 3
56. See supra note 47. See generally P. HETRICK, supra note 25, § 41, at 52; 4A G. THOMPSON,
supra note 18, § 2018, at 633-43. One author succinctly states that "[o]nly future litigation will
decide conclusively whether this does. . . avoid the perpetuities problem." Legal Challenges, supra
note 16, at 427 n.17.
57. H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL. PROPERTY § 68, at 58 (abr. ed. 1940).
58. P. HETRICK, supra note 25, § 64, at 77.
59. Kavanau Real Estate Trust v. Debnam, 41 N.C. App. 256, 254 S.E.2d 638, aflrd, 299 N.C.
510, 263 S.E.2d 595 (1979). See generally 3 G. THOMPSON, supra note 18, § 1015, at 2-9.
60. See Helicopter Corp. v. Cutter Realty Co., 263 N.C. 139, 139 S.E.2d 362 (1964) (statement
of state law on leases); M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 3.02[3][a].
61. Because a landlord-tenant relationship is created, a number of rights and duties are man-
dated by the North Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-38 to -56
(Cum. Supp. 1983).
62. M. HENzE, supra note 4, § 3.02[4][a]; see supra note 19.
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-40 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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More importantly, the Act deems a time share license to be an "inter-
est" in property." This provision directly vitiates the decisional law ex-
pressed by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Hill v. Smith.65 The
Smith court held that a license creates no interest in real property; the
licensee simply obtains a right to use the property under the licensor. 66
The degree of possession that distinguishes leases from licenses is ob-
lique, the most important factor being "whether the instrument gives ex-
clusive possession of the premises against all the world, including the
owner, in which case it is a lease, or whether it merely confers a privilege
to occupy under the owner, in which case it is a license."'6 7 By deeming a
time share license to be an interest in real estate, the NCTSA apparently
elevates the time share license into a leasehold interest. In North Caro-
lina, the terms "interest" and "estate" are synonymous and the estate
varies from "absolute ownership down to naked possession. '68 The time
share license clearly becomes something more than the common law li-
cense defined in Smith69 because, unlike the mere right to use, some de-
gree of possession is mandated by the NCTSA.
In determining if a lease or license has been created by the parties,
courts may consider other factors in addition to the exclusive right of
possession. These additional factors include the intent of the parties as
expressed in any written instrument, the degree of certainty in defining
the physical area to be used, and the expectation of compensation by the
owner for use of the premises.70
The purpose of the time share license is to provide the exclusive pos-
session of a unit for a stated period. If time share licensees were not
promised exclusive possession for the contract term, the successful mar-
keting of these licenses would be doubtful.
The time share licensee's entitlement to a specific physical area is more
difficult to analyze. The time share licensee may obtain (1) the right to
occupy a specified unit for a specified period, (2) an unspecified unit for a
specified period, (3) a specified unit for an unspecified period chosen by
the developer, or (4) an unspecified unit for an unspecified period both of
which are selected by the developer.7" In the two options in which a unit
64. Id. § 93A-42.
65. 51 N.C. App. 670, 277 S.E.2d 542 (1981) (citing Sanders v. Wilkerson, 285 N.C. 215, 204
S.E.2d 17 (1974)).
66. Id. at 675, 277 S.E.2d at 545.
67. Cal-Am Corp. v. Department of Real Estate, 104 Cal. App. 3d 453, 457, 163 Cal. Rptr.
729, 731 (1980); see supra note 23. See generally G. PINDAR, supra note 19, § 845, at 365; 3 G.
THOMPSON, supra note 18, § 1032, at 116.
68. Shoemaker v. Coats, 218 N.C. 251, 256, 10 S.E.2d 810, 814 (1940).
69. Accord Williamston & Tarboro R.R. v. Battle, 66 N.C. 540 (1872) (licensed coupled with an
"interest" is irrevocable). See generally R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 609-10 (3d
ed. 1981).
70. IA G. THOMPSON, supra note 18, § 223, at 219-21.
71. See supra note 7.
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1984], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol15/iss1/5
68 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
is specified, certainty of area is clearly established. In the two options in
which a unit is not specified, it is arguable that certainty of area is not
achieved. Even when a particular unit is not specified, however, the time
share licensee is guaranteed some unit within the development and exclu-
sive occupancy of that unit.
Unlike the common law "permissive use" license, the time share devel-
oper's expectation of compensation for the grant of a time share license is
inherent in the time share concept. Although time share developers may
not intend to provide purchasers with exclusive possession of a single
unit for profit, the time share license "approach is risky as there is little
to distinguish the license from the lease. The developer is gambling that
it won't be deemed a property interest.
72
The issue of whether a time share license is actually a lease has been
addressed in several states. In Cal-Am Corp. v. Department of Real Es-
tate,73 an intermediate California appellate court held that the interest
created is a lease. Cal-Am Corporation marketed "membership licenses"
in a Hawaii time share complex, which entitled the purchaserto an un-
specified unit, to be selected by the project management, for an unspeci-
fied week each year. The time share purchaser was also required to make
reservations at least sixty days in advance. The Cal-Am court based its
decision on the time share purchaser's right to exclusive possession of the
assigned unit. The court reasoned that "the fact that [management] re-
tains the right to specify which unit will be occupied and to provide
maintenance and maid service. . . does not derogate the exclusive pos-
sessory interests of the members during their annual periods of
[occupancy]." 74
The Supreme Court of Nevada, in State Dep't of Commerce, Div. of
Real Estate v. Carriage House Assocs., 7s held that a time share "member-
ship" was neither a lease nor a license. The time share plan in Carriage
House was similar to the one in Cal-Am with one exception: each time
share purchaser was entitled to annual occupancy for a number of years
estimated to be between forty and sixty years. The Carriage House court
held that the "membership" could not qualify as a lease because a lease-
hold interest requires specificity of term and certainty of area of the prop-
erty involved.76
The Cal-Am court reasoned that a license is a leasehold interest be-
cause a license requires exclusive occupancy. This reasoning alone, if
applied by the North Carolina courts, would be compelling. However,
72. M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 3.02[4][a].
73. 104 Cal. App. 3d 453, 163 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1980).
74. Id. at 457, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
75. 94 Nev. 678, 585 P.2d 1337 (1978).
76. Id. at 709, 585 P.2d at 1339.
13
Gheen: Time Sharing: The North Carolina General Assembly's Response to O
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1984
TIME SHARING
the NCTSA's mandate, that some "interest" in real property be con-
veyed by a time share license, provides an even stronger argument for
holding that the time share license is in fact a lease.
III. REGULATION OF TIME SHARE SALES
Although the NCTSA can be criticized for its simplistic treatment of
time shares as an interest in real property, the Act is more comprehen-
sive in its regulation of time share sales practices. The purpose of the
North Carolina General Statutes Commission in drafting the proposed
legislation was to protect the purchasing consumer.77 The approach
taken by the North Carolina General Assembly was direct regulation
and the requirement of comprehensive disclosures of material informa-
tion to the consumer.78
A. Registration of Developers and Licensing of Salesmen
The NCTSA prohibits the sale of time shares in North Carolina after
July 1, 1984, unless a certificate of registration is obtained by the devel-
oper from the North Carolina Real Estate Commission. 79 However, ef-
fective January 1, 1984, time share developers must apply for registration
77. Minutes, North Carolina General Statutes Commission (March 4, 1983) ("The draft is
geared mainly toward consumer protection .... ") (available from the North Carolina General
Statutes Commission).
This comment does not discuss the potential for additional consumer protections through the
regulation of time shares as securities. The NCTSA clearly recognizes that in certain cases, time
shares may be securities. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-50 (Cum. Supp. 1983). This provision was in-
cluded in the Act at the insistence of the North Carolina Secretary of State. Memorandum from F.
Daniel Bell, III, Securities Deputy, to Representatives William E. Clark and H. Martin Lancaster
(undated) (available from the North Carolina General Statutes Commission). See generally N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 98A-1 to -65 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983). North Carolina's securities laws will prob-
ably be found to be inapplicable. John R. Come, Securities Deputy for the Secretary of State, stated
that while "time-shares purchased for investment. . . can be considered securities,. . . that with-
out statutory language to that effect regulation will be difficult, since it is difficult to establish...
that an investment contract is a security." Minutes of the Condominium Statutes Drafting Commit-
tee of the North Carolina General Statutes Commission (October 15, 1980) (available from the
North Carolina General Statutes Commission).
The issue of state security regulation is only a precursor to the potential for federal regulation. At
this writing, the Securities and Exchange Commission has taken a no-policy position on regulation
which it established in 1974. In re The Innesfree Corp., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) § 79,935 (June 19, 1974). This no-policy position followed a brief period in which no-
action rulings were issued. Carribean Beach Club, Inc. [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) § 78,819 (May 25, 1972). See generally Byrne, Securities Regulation of Time-Sharing Resort
Condominiums, 7 REAL EST. L.J. 3 (1978) (advising how to avoid federal security regulation); Com-
ment, Regulating Timesharing: A More Effective Approach, 29 UCLA L. REv. 907 (1982) (an excel-
lent work supporting federal security regulation); Gunnar, supra note 1, at 35-42 (asserting no
position); Comment, supra note 2, at 636-39 (opposing federal security regulation).
78. The time share industry was generally supportive of the disclosure approach. Letter from
Julian D. Bobbit, Jr. to Special Deputy Attorney General Charles J. Murray (April 1, 1983) (avail-
able from the North Carolina General Statutes Commission) (Bobbit is counsel for Fairfield Com-
munities, Inc., one of the major developers of resort properties in North Carolina).
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-40 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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of the time share project.8 0 The application for registration, which must
be approved or disapproved by the Real Estate Commission within forty-
five days, is simple in nature and inexpensive. It requires the time share
developer to provide a description of the project, copies of time share
instruments to be sold, a copy of the proposed public offering statement,
copies of sales contracts, deed forms, information on the marketing and
management entity, information on any exchange program offered and
appointment of the Real Estate Commission as agent for service of pro-
cess.8" After the initial approval, the certificates of registration must be
renewed annually. 82
In its review of the application for registration, the Commission is lim-
ited to a determination of whether the application is complete and
whether the time share sales and project management will be directed by
individuals of "good moral character."83 The question of what standard
is imposed by "good moral character" was brought before the General
Statutes Commission in its drafting process,84 but the draft legislation
was approved by the Commission without further clarification.85 To
date, the "good moral character" standard has not been judicially defined
as applied to real estate brokers, salesmen or time share developers.
The "good moral character" standard used in the licensing of law-
yers86 has been judicially defined. However, the standard applied in li-
censing lawyers had never been considered to be applicable under the
NCTSA to a group of individuals. The standard was applied and defined
by Chief Justice Stacy in In re Applicants for License.87 Good moral
character "means that [the applicant] must have conducted himself as a
man of upright character ordinarily would, should or does." 8 Although
a rather general standard, the "good moral character" standard of In re
Applicants may be judicially applied under the NCTSA. Certainly the
Real Estate Commission must further define the "good moral character"
80. Id. § 93A-52(a).
81. Id. The time share developer must report promptly any changes in information submitted,
as well as any change in the developer's interest in the property. Id. The North Carolina Real
Estate Commission has promulgated administrative regulations generally reciting the statutory re-
quirements. 58B N.C. ADMIN. CODE §§.0101-.0104 (1984).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-52(d) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (certificates of registration expire June
30th of each year).
83. Id. § 93A-52(a).
84. Letter from John C. Kersten to Frank M. Bell (April 15, 1983) (available from the North
Carolina General Statutes Commission) ("This language appears to be impermissibly vague. How
and [by] what criteria is such a determination to be made?").
85. Minutes of the North Carolina General Statutes Commission (March 1, 1983) (available
from the North Carolina General Statutes Commission).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24 (1981 & Cam. Supp. 1983).
87. 191 N.C. 235, 131 S.E. 661 (1926) (defining "upright character").
88. Id. at 238, 131 S.E. at 663. NARELLO contains a more detailed list of criteria, the thrust
of which would evidence "good moral character." NARELLO, supra note 22, § 2-105(d)(3).
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standard as applied collectively to time share developers and salesmen, 89
even though it has not chosen to do so to date.
The NCTSA requires that all time share salesmen be licensed as real
estate brokers or salesmen.90 The licensing provision appears to afford
purchasers protection because licensed sales personnel would have met
the stringent educational and experience requirements. 91 The General
Assembly's objective was to help ensure that the public would receive
correct information from professionals when considering the purchase of
time shares. The General Assembly's objective may be thwarted by ex-
ceptions in the real estate licensing laws.92 In three different situations,
real estate licenses are not required. First, no license is required for indi-
viduals or associations who sell or lease their own property and the sale
or lease is "performed in the regular course of or incident to the manage-
ment of that property. . . . ,93 Second, even if the broker does not
personally own the property, any of his unlicensed salaried employees
may exhibit residential units to prospective tenants, provide information
about the project, and help prepare and accept applications for leases.94
Third, any owner who sells or leases his own property does not require a
license.95 If the time share developer is incorporated, the corporate of-
ficers or employees, acting on behalf of the corporation, need not be li-
censed. In the lease or sale of time share projects in which there is an
independent contracting managing entity, only one licensed broker
would be required. Non-licensed employees can handle most aspects of
time share sales transactions through the licensed broker. Given the na-
ture of time share sales,96 it is difficult to imagine many situations in
which licensed brokers or salesmen would be required as a matter of
law.97
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-51 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
90. Id. § 93A-40. The statute provides that:
From and after July 1, 1984, it shall be" unlawful for any person in this State to engage or
assume to engage in the business of a time share salesman without first obtaining a real estate
broker or salesman license issued by the North Carolina Real Estate Commission under the
provisions of Article I of this Chapter ....
Id. (emphasis added).
91. Id. §§ 93A-4, -5 (Cum. Supp. 1983) (specifying the licensing requirements).
92. Id. § 93A-2(c).
93. Id. § 93A-2(c)(1).
94. Id. § 93A-2(c)(6).
95. Id. § 93A-2(c)(7).
96. See generally M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 2.02[4] (one person's humorous experience with
time share salesmen). As the Whaler Inn situation illustrates, however, the experience can be
devastating.
97. North Carolina courts have, at times, been generous in applying the exceptions. See
McArver v. Gerukos, 265 N.C. 413, 144 S.E.2d 880 (1965); Gower v. Stout Realty, Inc., 56 N.C.
App. 603, 289 S.E.2d 880 (1982); North Carolina Real Estate Licensing Bd. v. Aikens, 31 N.C. App.
8, 228 S.E.2d 493 (1976). But see Cox v. North Carolina Real Estate Licensing Bd., 47 N.C. App.
135, 266 S.E.2d 851, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 87, 273 S.E.2d 296 (1980).
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B. Public Offering Statement
Every time share developer is required to deliver a public offering
statement to the purchaser before the contract of sale is executed.98 The
public offering statement must conspicuously disclose seven specific
items and any other information required by the Real Estate Commis-
sion's regulations. The specified items are: (1) the purchaser's financial
obligation; (2) the persons who may assess a maintenance charge and the
method of its calculation; (3) the terms and duration of any developer's
contract with the managing entity; (4) if the time share project is not
completed, when it and every amenity, will be completed; (5) the term of
the time share; (6) the purchaser's right to cancel the contract; and
(7) the method of recordation of the time share instrument.99
The Real Estate Commission's regulations comport with the seven dis-
closures mandated by the NCTSA, but do little more than recite the stat-
utory provisions. In addition to the statutory requirements, the Real
Estate Commission's regulations require that the public offering state-
ment completely disclose any information as to the existence of any vaca-
tion exchange program offered in conjunction with the time share
development."° In order to meet the Act's requirement that the seven
disclosures be conspicuous, the Real Estate Commission opted for a stan-
dardized one page summary to be attached to the cover of the offering
statement. The summary presents a series of questions covering the top-
ics required by statute and regulation. It also directs the purchaser to the
specific page in the body of the public offering statement on which the
particular question is answered. These questions are followed by a bold-
face notice of the "cooling-ofW' period in which the time share purchaser
may cancel the sales contract without liability. 101 The notice also in-
cludes suggested mailing instructions.
Neither the NCTSA nor the administrative regulations specifically re-
quire the public offering statement to contain a description of the prop-
erty interest conveyed in the developer's time share plan. In light of the
Act's requirement that such information be disclosed to the Real Estate
Commission in the project's registration statement as well as the general
objective of the Act to protect the consumer through the disclosure of all
material facts, this omission from the NCTSA is perplexing. Other states
require the specific disclosure of the real property interest to be con-
veyed. For example, Hawaii requires the developer to disclose whether
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-45(a) (Cum. Supp. 1983). If the public offering statement is not
provided to the purchaser as required, the purchaser, in addition to any other remedies, may recover
ten percent of the time share purchase price not exceeding three thousand dollars. Id.
99. Id. § 93A-44.
100. 58B N.C. ADMIN. CODE § .0201 (1984).
101. Id. § .0202.
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the time share plan is an ownership or right to use interest "with a de-
scription of the rights and responsibilities under said plan." ' 2 Given the
complexities of time share property interests, the potential for consumers
to misunderstand the facts, or for unscrupulous brokers or salesmen to
manipulate the facts, the NCTSA's failure to require the disclosure of the
property interest to be conveyed falls short of its consumer protection
objectives.
Additionally, the NCTSA and administrative regulations do not re-
quire that a description of any covenants be included in the public offer-
ing statement. In most time share plans, especially in the tenancy-in-
common time share estate, covenants are required to establish the peri-
ods of occupancy, liability for damage to the time share unit or its fur-
nishings and the remedies for occupant holdover. The Uniform Real
Estate Time Share Act (ULRETSA) provides comprehensive guidelines
for disclosure of this type of information. 0 3 Even though the purchaser
of a time share estate normally signs any covenants, in order to comply
with common law requirements for fixing periods of exclusive possession
among co-tenants, the disclosure of covenants prior to sale would more
adequately alert buyers to the intricate relationship among time share
owners. The North Carolina Real Estate Commission's failure to require
disclosure of co-purchaser covenants is regrettable.
C. "Cooling-Off," Liens, and Foreclosure
1. Protection of Time Share Purchasers through "Cooling-Off"
Periods
The NCTSA provides a five-day "cooling-off" period following execu-
tion of the sales contract for the time share purchaser."° During the
five-day period, the purchaser may rescind the contract without any fi-
nancial liability by hand-delivering or mailing notice of cancellation to
the developer or salesman.105 Numerous states follow this approach in
102. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 514-9(a)(6) (Supp. 1983). In non-ownership forms of time sharing
the developer must state any restraint on alienability. Id. § 514-9(a)(5). Eg., URETSA § 4-103(3),
7A U.L.A. (Supp. 1985).
103. URETSA § 4-103(a)(4), (12), (21), 7A U.L.A. 339-40 (Supp. 1985). URETSA's disclosure
requirements are the most comprehensive in nature and provide an excellent model for legislation.
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-45(a) (Cum. Supp. 1983). The developer must escrow funds for
ten days or until cancellation, whichever occurs first, or in lieu of escrow, provide a surety, cash
deposit, corporate bond or irrevocable letter of credit satisfactory to the Commission. Id. § 93A-
45(c). The General Statutes Commission felt a ten-day "cooling-off" period was the most important
protection for the consumer. Minutes of the North Carolina General Statutes Commission (March
1, 1983) (available from the North Carolina General Statutes Commission). The "cooling-off" pe-
riod was reduced to five days in the House of Representatives Committee on Judiciary III. Daily
Bulletin No. 117, Institute of Government, 1163 (June 23, 1983).
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-45(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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time share sales.1"6 In North Carolina, the five-day "cooling-off" period
may in fact be greater than five days. Absent statutory definitions, legal
periods of time are calculated under the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. 0 s The Rules of Civil Procedure provide that the day of exe-
cution of the contract is not counted and if the last day is a Saturday,
Sunday, or legal holiday, the concluding day is the next business day.
Intervening weekends and legal holidays are excluded from the calcula-
tion.1 8 Due to the history of high pressure sales tactics in the time share
industry, the five-day "cooling off" period seems adequate to permit ma-
ture reflection and introspection.
2. Protection of Time Share Purchasers from Liens and
Bankruptcy Foreclosures
There were three major concerns addressed by the General Assembly
in the NCTSA. These concerns were, first, protecting time share pur-
chasers in a foreclosure against the developer in bankruptcy or general
creditor foreclosure against the project; second, protecting time share
purchasers if a developer "absconds" with the funds leaving liens against
the time share development; and third, protecting co-owners of time
share interests from potential liens against another co-owner. To protect
the time share purchaser's interest in a bankruptcy proceeding from the
financial irresponsibility of a time share developer, the NCTSA requires
the developer to provide the time share purchaser with a release from all
liens prior to recordation of the instrument transferring the time share
interest sold. In the alternative, a developer may provide a surety bond
or insurance in an amount satisfactory to the Real Estate Commission.
In addition, any lienholder must agree to subordinate his rights to those
of the time share purchaser who complies with the sales contract. 0 9 To
protect a time share owner from liens of time share co-owners, the Act
106. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-11-5(2) (Supp. 1983) (five days); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, § 558(5) (Cum. Supp. 1982-83) (fifteen days).
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-593 (1969).
108. Id. § lA-l, Rule 6(a) (1983); see also Jackson v. Stanwood Corp., 38 N.C. App. 479, 248
S.E.2d 576 (1978).
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-57(a) (Cum. Supp. 1983). See generally Comment, supra note 2,
at 650-52 (commentary on abuses in time share development financing).
A release can be provided by a "take out commitment." This "commitment" is an agreement
with the mortgage-lender that upon sale of a time share, a percentage of the purchase price will be
used to repay the mortgagor's debt for which a release of any lien is negotiated. Comment, supra
note 2, at 651 n.129.
As to subordination of liens, the language of the Florida act is very similar to the NCTSA. How-
ever, the Florida statute provides that purchasers shall also be furnished with a copy of a recorded
nondisturbance instrument from every lien holder who has a recorded lien against the property upon
which the accommodations or facilities to be used by the purchaser are situated. The nondis-
turbance instrument must provide that upon foreclosure, the succeeding owner shall take title to the
property subject to the possessory rights of the purchasers. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.08(3)(c) (Cum.
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provides for a mandatory release procedure.110
a. Protection from bankruptcy foreclosure
Subsequent to the enactment of the NCTSA, Congress enacted the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984111
(BAFJA) to help alleviate the unique problems associated with time
shares in a bankruptcy proceeding. The Whaler Inn incident may pro-
vide insights into the effectiveness of the North Carolina and congres-
sional enactments.
The status of time share owners in a developer bankruptcy was first
addressed in In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc. "1 2 In Sombrero, the time
share developer sold time share interests for a thirty-year term, with no
remainder. The time share developer retained the right to assign one-
week occupancy periods and specific units on an availability basis." 3
The bankruptcy court held that the time share contracts, even those fully
paid for, were executory and, therefore, subject to rejection by the
debtor-in-possession. The court reasoned that the contracts were execu-
tory because the debtor-developer maintained an obligation to provide
maintenance and room service while the purchasers remained obligated
for an annual maintenance fee.
114
In finding that all of the time share contracts were executory, the Som-
brero court faced the crucial issue of classifying the property interest. If
classified as a leasehold interest, the time share purchasers would receive
special statutory protections in bankruptcy accorded leases and execu-
tory contracts for the sale of real estate." 5 If the contracts were deemed
non-freehold interests in real estate, time share purchasers would be mere
unsecured creditors, and a civil action against a bankrupt developer
would be virtually meaningless as the developer would be judgment
proof. The court held that the time share contracts were neither leases
nor contracts for the sale of land because "[t]he drafters appear to have
been unwilling to describe or limit the contract to a more definite or
Supp. 1984). See generally URETSA § 4-109, 7A U.L.A. 344-45 (Supp. 1985); NARELLO §§ 10-
101, -108, 117, 118 (1983); P. HETRICK, supra note 25, §§ 409-55, at 476-537.
For an excellent discussion of federal and state tax liens in the time share context, see generally,
Legal Challenges, supra note 16, at 428-31. Since publication of the Legal Challenges article, the
Internal Revenue Service has stated that when a delinquent taxpayer lien must be foreclosed on a
time share, "[t]he. . .lien may be enforced against the delinquent taxpayer's interest but not against
the condominium itself." Rev. Rul. 79-55, 1979-1 C.B. 400, 401.
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-57(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
111. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
title III, §§ 101, 410-04, 98 Stat. 367 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 402-404).
112. 18 Bankr. 612 (D. Fla. 1982).
113. Id. at 614.
114. Id. at 616-17 (ruling on 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1982)).
115. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h), (i) (1982).
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conventional category of real property interest." '116 The court also relied
on the failure of Florida's time share legislation to define the property
interest conveyed by a time share contract. The Florida statute defining
time shares recognized that an interest in property might not be con-
veyed in all cases.1 17 Because the time share contracts were non-freehold
estates, the court correctly concluded that they were not executory con-
tracts for the sale of real property.
Even in the face of the drafter's inability to define the property interest
and the lack of statutory clarity, the court recognized that the classifica-
tion of the Sombrero contracts as a lease was a more difficult question."18
The court relied on three factors in holding the property interest was not
a lease. First, the contracts defined the relationship as a "membership,"
indicating the parties' intent to convey a license rather than a lease. Sec-
ond, the contracts did not conform to the state's witnessing requirements
for leases of greater than one year. Third, the court reasoned that the
right to possess a unit was incidental to the recreational facilities actually
bargained for." 9
In Sombrero, the time share owners argued that their contracts could
not be rejected by the debtor-developer because of Florida's legislative
mandate that their right of possession be honored by subsequent pur-
chasers.' The time share contracts themselves contained the required
statutory provisions.' 2 1 The court held that the debtor-in-possession
could reject the time share contracts under federal law even though it
would constitute a breach of contract for which damages could be
awarded.' 22 The court refused to apply the Florida statute which re-
quired subsequent purchasers of the time share development to recognize
the right of possession of prior time share purchasers, because it found
that if the Florida statute had been designed to prevent a breach by the
debtor-in-possession of the time share estate, it would "frustrate" federal
bankruptcy law, and therefore, was invalid. 123
Recognizing that the Sombrero rationale could be applied by other
bankruptcy courts, the North Carolina General Assembly mandated that
all time share interests are "interests" in real property in order to avoid a
similar result. Federal bankruptcy courts are to determine property in-
terests in accordance with the applicable state law. 24 Inasmuch as the
116. Sombrero, 18 Bankr. at 617.
117. Id. at 618.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 619.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 620.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Eg., In re Aienel Furniture, Inc., 13 Bankr. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1980); In re Hospitality Assoc.,
Inc., 6 Bankr. 778 (D. Or. 1980).
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NCTSA provides that all time shares are "interests" in property, 125 and
assuming that the interest will probably be classified by the state's judici-
ary as fee simple estates and leases, federal law126 would protect the pur-
chaser's property interest in a bankruptcy sale. The logic employed by
the General Assembly was simply to abolish the time share license in
North Carolina.
Congressional enactment of BAFJA accomplished the same result as
the North Carolina legislation, but in a more direct manner. BAFJA
also affords some additional protections for the time share purchaser.
Congress defined a time share estate to include all legal interests from a
license to fee simple absolute ownership. The definition of time share
includes not only an interest in projects designed for occupancy but also
any time share facility, e.g., campgrounds, recreational sites, or tennis
courts. The only limitation imposed on the definition of time share is
that the interest must be conveyed for more than three years, with use
either during consecutive or non-consecutive periods annually.12 7 If the
trustee rejects an- unexpired time share interest 28 or executory con-
tract 129 in bankruptcy proceedings, the holder of the time share interest
may deem the time share interest terminated if it constitutes a breach
under the terms of the contract with the debtor, state law, or covenants
among time share co-owners. The owner of the time share interest may
elect to remain in possession of the time share for the balance of any
contract term. Also, the owner may elect to exercise any optional con-
tract periods.130 If the time share purchaser remains in possession, that
individual may elect to offset damages occurring after rejection against
rent reserved under a lease or monies due for the balance of the term.
Any offset is limited to the amount which may be due the debtor, and
any claims against the debtor which arise after rejection are limited to
the offset only. 1
31
The bankruptcy proceeding involving the Whaler Inn is the first North
Carolina case in which BAFJA will be applicable.' 32 The Whaler Inn,
owned by Time Sharing, Inc. (TSI), was converted from a resort hotel to
a time share project in 1982. The conversion was financed by a 1.8 mil-
lion dollar loan obtained from First Savings & Loan Association of Suf-
folk, Virginia (FSLA), and secured by a first mortgage on the Whaler
Inn. TSI planned to sell time shares which were to be tenancies-in-coin-
125. See supra text accompanying notes 2-16.
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982).
127. Id. § 101(47).
128. Id. § 365(h)(1).
129. Id. § 365(i)(1).
130. Id. § 365(h)(1).
131. Id. § 365(h)(2).
132. BAFJA provisions applicable to Whaler Inn were effective on the date of enactment, July
10, 1984. Whaler Inn was not placed into Chapter 11 bankruptcy until several months later.
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mon by dividing each of forty-seven rooms into fifty, one-week interests.
TSI was to retain ownership of two, one-week interests for annual main-
tenance. If the time share purchaser paid the full sales price in cash, TSI
was obligated to execute a deed to the purchaser and then forward to the
mortgage-lender twenty-five percent of the gross sales price in exchange
for the lender's release of his lien as to that purchaser. If the purchaser
made a down payment and financed the balance of the purchase price
with TSI, no deed was executed and TSI did not apply for a release. 133
TSI failed to issue deeds or apply for the release of the mortgage-lender's
lien in a substantial number of instances. As a result, some purchasers
who paid cash either did not receive a deed from TSI, a release from the
lender, or both. An even greater number of purchasers financed the sale
through TSI and were not entitled to a deed or lender's release.
TSI defaulted on its note with FSLA 1 4 and on June 1, 1984, a North
Carolina superior court ordered the Whaler Inn into receivership. Five
days later, the superior court ordered the receiver to cease sales of any
time shares, but to maintain the property.1 35 Citizens Savings and Loan,
now administering TSI's mortgage, filed for foreclosure under the deed of
trust and the court approved the foreclosure sale of Whaler Inn. 36 In
order to forestall the scheduled foreclosure sale, TSI filed for a Chapter
11 bankruptcy invoking an automatic stay of the foreclosure sale.137 The
automatic stay of sale was sought in order to allow time to develop a plan
to rehabilitate the Whaler Inn.138
A Model Plan of Reorganization has been developed and is currently
under review by all parties. Essentially, the Plan proposes that the ex-
isting time share owners form a stock cooperative corporation to receive
all assets and liabilities of the debtor and resume sale of time shares at the
Whaler Inn. Each time share owner would have the option to purchase
up to five shares of stock in the corporation. This stock could not be sold
unless the time share estate owned is sold with the shares of stock. Time
share owners are not required to purchase stock in order to protect their
interest in the development. However, in order for the rehabilitation
plan to work, at least seven hundred shares of stock must be sold at two
thousand dollars per share.
The Whaler court has not yet been required to define the applicability
of BAFJA. It would appear that those owners who received deeds from
TSI and the mortgage-lender will have a protectable interest. However,
133. In re Time Sharing, Inc., No. M-84-01551-4 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. December 27, 1984).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. Citizens Savings and Loan assumed administration of TSI's loan, having taken it by
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the BAFJA protections may be meaningless. If Whaler Inn cannot be
rehabilitated and is liquidated, there is no assurance that the Whaler Inn
would be used as a time share resort after the sale. If not used as a time
share development, the time share owners may have a legal interest in the
property with no practical use of their interest. The only practical sale of
their interests would be to the Whaler Inn's ultimate purchaser. How-
ever, the market value of their nominal interests in the real estate would
likely be substantially less than the original market value. If the rehabili-
tation plan fails, the time share owners, at best, are in a precarious
position.
Although the NCTSA was not in effect when time shares were sold at
the Whaler Inn, the probable application of the NCTSA in bankruptcy
proceedings similar to those involving the Whaler Inn can be envisioned.
The Act's designation of the time share as a real property interest has
been duplicated in BAFJA, with the unresolved issue being the practical
remedies to be fashioned by a bankruptcy court to effectively protect that
interest. The NCTSA's provision for the release of liens and the require-
ment of insurance coverage or bonding "prior to recordation of the in-
strument transferring a time share" '13 9 is ineffective in preventing
developers from illegally diverting sale proceeds. To date, the Real Es-
tate Commission has neither acted to more carefully define when release,
insurance, or bonding must be effective, nor has set the amounts of insur-
ance or bonding that will be required if used as an alternative to the lien
release procedure.
An effective approach may be that utilized in Florida. The Florida
procedure requires that when a leasehold estate is conveyed, one hundred
percent of the contract payments must be held in escrow. 14° The escrow
principle could be adapted to the sale of fee simple time share estates.
The system would require that an adequate portion of any down pay-
ment made by the purchaser be placed in escrow or committed to the
time share developer's mortgagee, as well as escrowing a percentage of
the monthly payment made to the time share developer who finances the
balance of the purchase price. The escrow system would be coupled with
either monthly or quarterly reporting requirements by the developer to
the Real Estate Commission. This proposal is a radical departure from
the doctrine of caveat emptor applied in North Carolina real estate sales.
However, given the unique qualities of time sharing, this system appears
necessary to adequately protect the consuming public.
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-57(a) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
140. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.08(2) (Cum. Supp. 1984). In lieu of an escrow the division director
may provide a surety bond or an irrevocable letter of credit. Id. § 721.08(5).
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b. Protection from liens
The NCTSA also provides for the release from a time share pur-
chaser's lien which could be assessed against time share co-owners. Such
liens, except for mortgages or deeds of trust, may be satisfied by individ-
ual co-owners' payment of a proportional amount of the lien based on a
ratio of the shares of all time share owners. Upon receiving the propor-
tional payment, the lienor must provide a release to the time share
owner.' 4 ' Extinguishment of time share developer and co-owner liens
was not a part of the draft legislation by the General Statutes Commis-
sion and, therefore, was not recommended to the General Assembly.
These provisions were requested by Representative H. Martin Lancaster,
co-sponsor of the NCTSA. 4 2 Providing for the right of each time share
purchaser to extinguish co-owner liens is a foresighted innovation and
should prove effective in many situations.
D. Civil and Criminal Actions in the Sale of Time Shares
The NCTSA specifically grants the Real Estate Commission substan-
tial investigatory and disciplinary powers in regulating time share sales,
salesmen, and developers.' 43 The Commission may suspend or revoke
real estate licenses or certificates of project registration, reprimand or
censure time share salesmen or developers, and fine developers up to five
hundred dollars"4 for violating each of thirteen specified acts or omis-
sions and any administrative regulations ultimately adopted. The thir-
teen categories of acts or omissions are almost totally dedicated to the
protection of prospective purchasers of time share contracts from false,
misleading or deceptive sales practices.' 45 The grant of regulatory au-
thority to the Real Estate Commission is unique in North Carolina real
property law.
In addition to administrative remedies, the NCTSA makes a violation
of its provisions an unclassified misdemeanor punishable by fine, impris-
onment, or both." All unclassified misdemeanors are punishable by a
fine left in the discretion of the court and imprisonment for up to two
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-57(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
142. Letter from Representative H. Martin Lancaster to Charles Murray, Special Deputy Attor-
ney General (May 12, 1983) (available from the North Carolina General Statutes Commission).
Representative Lancaster stated:
I feel it is very important that this legislation address in some fashion the protection of buyers
from developers who go bankrupt or abscond with funds so that the original deed of trust on the
development is foreclosed and they lose everything. I would like for the Committee Substitute
to include something on that.
Id.
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-54 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
144. Id. § 93A-54(a).
145. Id.
146. Id. § 93A-56.
25
Gheen: Time Sharing: The North Carolina General Assembly's Response to O
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1984
TIME SHARING
years, or both. 47 However, if the offense is "infamous ... with deceit
and intent to defraud" 148 it is reclassified as a felony punishable by fine,
imprisonment up to ten years, or both. 49 One North Carolina case has
held that an attempt to obtain property by false pretenses would be an
"infamous" crime within the meaning of the statute and punishable as a
felony.150 It is conceivable that the fradulent sale of time shares may
invoke the greater statutory penalties.
Beyond the regulatory powers of the Real Estate Commission, the
NCTSA clearly provides that the time share purchaser, or any person
injured by a sales practice, retains an unencumbered right of private ac-
tion. 5 ' Of the numerous possible civil actions, North Carolina General
Statute, section 75-1.1 offers significant potential for redress for false,
misleading or deceptive sales practices. The provisions for treble dam-
ages in the Unfair Trade Practice Act (UTPA) 52 and for the award of
attorney fees'5 3 ensure it active use in litigation. Equally important, the
UTPA authorizes investigations and suits on behalf of the public by the
North Carolina Attorney General.' 54 In litigating under the UTPA, the
Attorney General may seek the extraordinary remedy of rescission of
contracts and restitution of monies. 55 This remedy may be uniquely
valuable for time share purchasers beyond the five-day "cooling-off"
period.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), under the Unfair Trade and
Practices Act,' 56 is entering the time share field primarily in the area of
sales practices. In one case, the FTC has issued a cease and desist order
to prohibit a market development firm from using unfair and deceptive
trade practices. The firm was luring potential time share purchasers into
high pressure time share seminars at a development owned by its parent
corporation.' 7 In a landmark cases, the FTC filed for a preliminary and
permanent injunction against one developer for misleading potential buy-
ers by printing brochures depicting time share units which were more
luxurious than those available, misstating the city in which some units
were available, and for deception in describing the nature of the time
147. Id. § 14-3(a) (1981).
148. Id. § 14-3(b).
149. Id. § 14-1.1(a)(8).
150. State v. Page, 32 N.C. App. 478, 232 S.E.2d 460, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 463, 235 S.E.2d 64
(1977).
151. A discussion, even of all the major civil actions, is beyond the scope of this comment.
152. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1981).
153. Id. § 75-16.1.
154. Id. § 75-9.
155. Id. § 75-15.1.
156. See also 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982) (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981) is virtually identical to the
FTCA on unfair trade practices).
157. Market Development Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REp. (CCH) 21,651 (January 15, 1980).
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share interest being sold.1 18 It seems inevitable that greater FTC inter-
vention will be forthcoming.
IV. MANAGEMENT OF TIME SHARE DEVELOPERS
While the consumer protection provisions of the NCTSA are compre-
hensive, the Act is virtually devoid of provisions regulating the manage-
ment of time share projects. The Act contains only one provision
relating to management practices. Yet, managment of the time share
complex is one of the crucial factors in the success of a project.15 9 Man-
agement of a time share project may prove more cumbersome than man-
agement of condominium projects primarily because of the greater
number of owners and their transient use of the facility. Time share de-
velopments that employ a lease program present special considerations
because the leaseholders do not control management.
The paucity of NCTSA provisions regulating time share management
entities can be explained by the legislative history of the Act. The
NCTSA was conceptualized by the Condominium Statutes Drafting
Committee of the General Statutes Commission in September, 1980.160
By the end of that year, the Drafting Committee had rejected the idea of
adopting model time share legislation,1 6' but agreed to incorporate time
sharing into the Unit Ownership Act. 62 The Drafting Committee estab-
lished the policy that time shares "would be treated identically to condo-
minium units and directed that the provisions regulating time shares
specifically set out which ,particular sections treat time shares
differently."1 6
3
When the draft legislation was considered by the full General Statutes
Commission, the Drafting Committee's approach was maintained.
164
The Commission reversed its position, however, and recodified the pro-
posed legislation specifically placing time sharing under Chapter 93A of
158. Paradise Palms Vacation Club, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1979-1983 Transfer Binder)
21,875 (W.D. Wash., September 30, 1981) (docketed as FTC v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club, No.
C81116(V). See generally Dickerson, Litigating Resort Timeshare Abuses, 4 NAT'L L.J., June 7,
1982, at 44, col. 1; Smith, Timeshare Regulation, 4 NAT'L L.J., May 24, 1982, at 43, col. 4.
159. See generally Pollack, supra note 1, at 288 ("Management is an essential factor in the value
of a time-share project ...."); Comment, supra note 2, at 648 ("Effective ongoing management
plays a critical role in timeshare projects.").
160. Minutes of the Condominium Statutes Drafting Committee of the North Carolina General
Statutes Commission (September, 1980) (available from the North Carolina General Statutes
Commission).
161. Id. (October 15, 1980).
162. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47A-1 to -37 (Cui. Supp. 1983).
163. Minutes of the Condominium Statutes Drafting Committee of the North Carolina General
Statutes Commission (December 18, 1980) (emphasis added) (available from the North Carolina
General Statutes Commission).
164. Minutes of the North Carolina General Statutes Commission (March 4, 1983) (available
from the North Carolina General Statutes Commission).
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the North Carolina General Statutes, which governs the North Carolina
Real Estate Licensing Commission. The policy change was made at the
insistence of the Real Estate Commission, which would be responsible
for regulating time share developers, salesmen, and sales.16 This seem-
ingly simple recodification separated the time share provisions from all
underlying management controls contained in the Unit Ownership
Act.16
6
The Unit Ownership Act is permissive. 16 Therefore, time share devel-
opers can avoid its provisions and establish management arrangements
virtually unregulated. Developers can and may choose to qualify under
both the Unit Ownership Act and the NCTSA. Because several forms of
time sharing are based on a condominium principle, dual registration
may be a desirable method of determining the rights and duties between
the management entity and time share purchasers, and of defining rela-
tionships among purchasers.
The NCTSA's single requirement for management relates to proxy
voting. The Act limits the duration of any proxy to one year if it is
obtained from a purchaser and it relates to employment of a managing
entity. 168 This provision prevents potential "sweet-heart" contracts
169
between the managing entity and the developer.
Two URETSA proposals which govern management of the time share
project would provide the purchaser with a more adequate means of self-
government. These provisions are the owner initiative and the referen-
dum.1 70 The owner initiative permits purchasers to amend unrecorded
project documents and approve or disapprove any proposed expenditure
by the managing entity. An owner must secure a petition, stating any
proposal, signed by at least one co-owner in each unit; the number of
units then must comprise one-third of the allocated votes. Next, a ballot
is prepared by the managing entity and mailed to each owner. 7 1 A sim-
ple majority normally determines the issue172 and any action adopted is
binding for three years unless modified by a subsequent initiative.
173
A referendum would be required whenever the managing entity pro-
165. Id. (April 1, 1983).
166. The Unit Ownership Act provides numerous provisions relating to governance of condo-
minium projects. The more significant provisions relate to the use of common areas and facilities, to
maintenance, to compliance with bylaws, regulations and covenants, to inter se damages, and to civil
actions on common interests. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47A-8 to -10, -13, -16, -19, -21 to -26 (1984).
167. Id. §§ 47A-2, -4.
168. Id. § 93A-47 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
169. "Sweet heart" contracts are those in which the developer retains long term contracts with
the managing entity established by that developer, even though the developer no longer owns any
interest in the property.
170. URETSA § 3-117, 7A U.L.A. 336-37 (Supp. 1985); id. § 3-116, 7A U.L.A. 336.
171. Id. § 3-117(b), 7A U.L.A. 336-37.
172. Id. § 3-115(c), 7A U.L.A. at 336.
173. Id. § 3-115(d).
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poses an amendment to the recorded project documents. 74 Within
thirty to one hundred and eighty days prior to tabulation of any vote,
ballots must be mailed to each time share owner1 75 and a simple majority
is sufficient on most issues.'
76
Given the unique nature of time sharing, the owner initiative and the
referendum are worthy of North Carolina legislative enactment. Each
measure would certainly help time share purchasers negotiate more effec-
tively with the managing entity.
V. CONCLUSION
The NCTSA is a beginning toward an effective regulation of the time
share industry. By eliminating the use of time share licenses in North
Carolina and mandating that a property interest be conveyed, the Act
affords some protection to time share purchasers. However, the Act
takes an overly simplistic approach to the seemingly endless contractual
arrangements known as time sharing. Further legislative clarification is
needed for the regulation of the exotic interval ownership estates, if they
are to be permitted at all in this state.
Congress has supplanted the General Assembly's attempt to afford
time share purchasers some protection in a developer bankruptcy. The
remaining question is how, and to what extent, legally and practically,
the bankruptcy court can protect the time share owners if the resort is
sold. Fortunately, BAFJA places the owner in a better position than that
accorded the Sombrero time share owners.'
77
The NCTSA does not effectively protect time share purchasers from
developer liens. Requiring lender releases, subordination of creditors
and insurance or bonding "prior" to recordation simply can not deter a
dishonest developer, broker, or salesman. The language employed in the
Act is general enough to permit the Real Estate Commission to correct
some obvious situations by administrative regulation. The Commission
has yet to aggressively adopt regulations beyond the bare requirements of
the NCTSA. The Whaler Inn should provide instructive lessons as well
as incentive for the Commission to act. The historical attitude of caveat
emptor in real estate sales obviously provides a psychological deterrent to
overly regulating property sales. However, time sharing is a unique
property concept-in reality an ingenuous marketing concept-which
does not lend itself to traditional attitudes or regulations.
The primary purpose of the NCTSA, the protection of consumers in
the sale of time shares, has been more adequately met. If the North Car-
174. Id. § 3-116(a).
175. Id. § 3-116(b).
176. Id. § 3-116(c).
177. See In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc., 18 Bankr. 612 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
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olina Real Estate Commission aggressively regulates the industry, its
powers, coupled with those of the Attorney General, could ensure ade-
quate governmental supervision in the registration of developments and
sales practices. However, the Real Estate Commission must be careful to
provide more detailed regulation of the public offering statement and spe-
cific prohibited sales practices through administrative regulations.
The NCTSA fails in regulating the management of time share projects.
This failure is unjustifiable. Adequately protecting the consumer prior to
ownership is an incomplete accomplishment if time share owners cannot
be assured of secure and quality management. The North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly should require that time share developments comply with
the Unit Ownership Act or, preferably, consider adopting URETSA
management provisions. At least one member of the Condominium Stat-
utes Drafting Committee argued that the adoption of URETSA in North
Carolina is justified and necessary.' 7 8 It is an argument that deserves a
second chance.
STEPHEN T. GHEEN
178. Memorandum from Monica K. Kalo to the General Statutes Commission's Condominium
Statutes Drafting Committee (undated) (available from the North Carolina General Statutes
Commission).
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